Christian conscience and the case for ADF reform

By Rod Benson

The hardest conscientious-objection case is not necessarily that of a prospective conscript who declines to enlist. It may be that of an experienced service member whose beliefs change, who wants to act honestly without abandoning colleagues or disregarding military law. Australia’s present legislation separates the express protection available in the wartime call-up framework from the powers governing serving volunteers. A considered response requires theological discernment and a practicable proposal for institutional reform.

The New Testament does not offer a single, unqualified rule for Christian participation in military service. Romans 13:1–7 recognises the legitimate functions of governing authority; Acts 5:29 marks the priority of obedience to God when human authority conflicts with it. Matthew 5:43–48 presses disciples to love their enemies. These texts are not interchangeable slogans. Together they force inquiry into authority’s limits, the moral character of means employed and the continuing humanity of an adversary. They do not, by themselves, settle every question of combatant service.

Christian pacifist traditions argue that following the non-violent way of Jesus excludes participation in warfare or the intentional killing of enemies. Just-war reasoning, developed through Augustine and Aquinas and subsequently revised, holds that force may sometimes be permitted to protect justice and the vulnerable, subject to demanding restraints. These traditions differ over whether war can be justified at all, yet both can sustain principled objections to particular practices and operations. Selective conscientious objection is therefore not incoherent merely because its proponent rejects some wars but not all.

Conscience deserves neither automatic deference nor institutional suspicion. It is a moral judgment for which a person remains responsible, capable of development and also of error. A mature claim invites scrutiny of its consistency, sources, duration and practical implications; it should not require agreement with the claimant’s theology. Nor should disciplinary risk be mistaken for evidence that belief is genuine: governments should not force people to incur punishment simply to demonstrate sincerity.

The Uniting Church’s Basis of Union locates the Church’s common life in allegiance to Jesus Christ, the risen crucified one, and depicts the Church as a fellowship of reconciliation and a pilgrim people subject to correction. Its account of biblical witness and the reformability of the Church’s own law makes it difficult to treat any human institution as beyond moral examination. This is a theological inference from the Basis, not a claim that it prescribes a specific military discharge procedure. The Church may honour those who serve conscientiously and those who, equally conscientiously, conclude they cannot continue.

Recent public statements offer a concrete but limited indication of the Church’s priorities. On 4 March 2026, Uniting Church President Rev Charissa Suli called for diplomacy, protection of civilians, humanitarian aid and resistance to escalating militarism. Such an appeal expresses a vocation to peacemaking, but it cannot fairly be presented as the Church’s universal prohibition of military service or as an official endorsement of any specific proposal developed here. It nevertheless invites the Church to engage more rigorously with the personal cost of warfare and conscientious objection.

A congregation may take action on these grounds by providing confidential pastoral care, disciplined study of Scripture, moral conversation with both pacifist and just-war voices, practical support for family members, and referral to independent legal practitioners familiar with Defence law. Any letter supporting an objector should describe what the writer actually knows: the person’s history of Christian belief and observed sincerity and reasoning, not a hastily assembled defence of legal entitlement. The Church should avoid treating an individual as morally superior merely for objecting, or as morally inferior for continuing lawful service.

The immediate reform objective should be modest but substantive: a publicly accessible process by which serving ADF members can seek accommodation or authorised separation when a newly developed, fundamental conscientious conviction conflicts with continued service. Such a process would not convert private belief into command authority, guarantee discharge on demand or authorise unauthorised refusal of duties. It would instead specify what decision-makers must consider, what temporary arrangements might be possible and how reasons and review are provided.

The statutory definition in Defence Act section 4(3)—a fundamental, compelling and likely enduring conviction, whether religious or non-religious—offers a useful starting vocabulary, though Parliament would need to decide whether and how to adapt it to serving volunteers. The review ought to distinguish objections to all military service, combatant participation, particular conflicts and particular unlawful acts. The final category is primarily a legal-compliance issue, not a claim that needs a discretionary conscientious-objection concession.

First, a member should have a defined confidential application route and prompt acknowledgement, with access to independent legal and pastoral advice. Second, assessment should focus on the seriousness and coherence of conviction rather than a favoured religion or political position; reasonable evidence may include the evolution of belief and the implications the applicant accepts. Third, a trained decision-maker, independent of the immediate command chain where practicable, should give written reasons, while allowing commanders to provide evidence about operational consequences. These are proposed safeguards, not presently verified ADF entitlements.

Fourth, the process should distinguish interim accommodation from final exemption: where operationally feasible, non-combatant duties, temporary reassignment or adjusted responsibilities might reduce irreparable conscience conflicts while the claim is assessed. Fifth, deadlines should be sufficiently prompt for imminent deployment but compatible with procedural fairness. Sixth, review must be accessible and capable of correcting error, without misrepresenting the current Part 8 grievance process as an appeal automatically determining a person’s moral status. Seventh, an agreed transition or release should address obligations to colleagues, handover, service debt and the implications of Reserve status.

Special rules would be needed for wartime emergencies, deployed units and situations where reassignment might transfer serious danger unfairly to others. A workable system could provide expedited assessment, documented command-level risk evaluation and narrow temporary measures rather than an automatic suspension of all duties. Conversely, staffing pressures alone should not excuse indefinite delay. Any policy would need to clarify legal authority, confidentiality, privacy, the relationship with discipline and the safeguards against retaliatory treatment.

One objection is that voluntary enlistment itself settles the matter: an adult has promised to serve and must bear the consequences. That argument rightly protects trust and planning, especially where training is expensive and assignments are hazardous. It is less persuasive where it assumes that genuine conscience cannot change, or where no method exists to adjudicate a changed conviction. Another objection is that a claim process invites opportunism; fair evidence and review procedures answer some, though not all, of that risk. No administrative test can make sincerity perfectly transparent.

A different objection concerns equality. Why should military personnel have a conscience-based exit when many civilian workers face difficult moral compromises? The response is the distinctive gravity of military obligations, including readiness to use lethal force and severe sanctions for disobeying lawful orders. These features justify unusually careful treatment of irreconcilable convictions without implying that military undertakings are optional. Conversely, exemptions must not be administered so loosely that the burden of danger falls systematically on those who do not object.

The Uniting Church could contribute to consultation on a Defence policy or legislative review by bringing together chaplains, veterans, serving personnel, legal scholars, pacifists, just-war thinkers and those affected by armed conflict. That diversity would test whether the proposal respects both institutional reliability and conscience. The Church would also need to scrutinise its own rhetoric. Appeals to peace and nonviolence should be matched by serious engagement with the protection of vulnerable populations and with the consequences of withdrawal from security obligations.

A practical starting point is a narrowly focused public discussion paper asking Defence to publish clear information about the treatment of subsequently acquired conscientious objection, including available administrative avenues, possible accommodation, service debts and review rights. The next step could be an independently informed consultation on whether explicit regulations or legislation are needed. The existence of broad change-of-service and grievance powers does not establish that the present system has no relevant policy; the published materials examined here are insufficient to establish a guaranteed, dedicated right to discharge.

Conscientious objection is not the same as moral disobedience, cowardice, political dissent or a claim to be morally infallible. It concerns the possibility that continued service has become incompatible with a fundamental conviction. A credible Australian framework would permit that claim to be heard and, where justified, accommodated or resolved by lawful release without making individual preference a substitute for command. Christian theology deepens rather than dissolves the dilemma: loyalty, neighbour-love, restraint, courage and the possibility of moral conversion all matter. The resulting goal is neither exemption without responsibility nor discipline without conscience, but a fair institution capable of recognising both.


Rev Dr Rod Benson lives in Sydney and writes about a range of topics from books and local history to food, faith, philosophy, ethics, research skills, and everyday life. Away from the keyboard, he enjoys cooking for friends, walking in the Australian bush, exploring a beach, discovering new restaurants, and reading philosophy, fiction and poetry. He is married to Emma and is minister of North Rocks Community Church, a Uniting Church congregation.

Taken together, this and the previous article identify the legal gap and outline a testable reform agenda in the Australian context.

References

Augustine, Contra Faustum, 22.74; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II–II, q 40, a 1 (classical sources, not contemporary legal authorities). https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm

Charissa Suli, “A Call for Peace and the Protection of Human Life”, statement, 4 March 2026. https://uniting.church/a-call-for-peace-and-the-protection-of-human-life-presidents-statement-on-middle-east-conflict/

Defence Act 1903 (Cth), Part IV, especially ss 4(3), 59–61A, 61C, 61CA–61CP; compilation 29 September 2026. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C1903A00020/latest

Defence Force Discipline Act 1982 (Cth), ss 14, 23–24, 27; compilation 29 September 2026. https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A02711/latest

Defence Regulations 2026 (Cth), ss 2, 11, 17–18, 20, 23, 25, 48–60 and Schedule 1; commenced 1 October 2026. https://www.legislation.gov.au/F2026L01185/asmade

Uniting Church in Australia, Basis of Union, especially “The way into union”, “Built upon the one Lord Jesus Christ”, “The Biblical witnesses” and “Law in the church”. https://uniting.church/basisofunion/

Image source: Department of Defence

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