The Art of Faithful Love (Part 1)

What forms does human love take? C. S. Lewis and The Four Loves

Love. It’s almost certainly the most frequently invoked human emotion. It’s the subject of thousands of stories and songs. At the same time, it’s among the least precisely differentiated concepts in ordinary discourse. The same term is used for spouses, children, friends, communities, activities, places, and God, often without sufficient attention to the distinct forms of attachment, obligation, desire, or devotion that may be involved.

Christian theology introduces a further complexity. It is easy to misread the biblical affirmation “God is love” (1 John 4:8) as implying that whatever we experience or name as love must therefore be morally good. In 1960, British scholar and writer C. S. Lewis attempted to clarify exactly what thoughtful Christians mean by “love” when the single English word covers several significantly different kinds of human attachment.

Lewis’s concern was both psychological and moral. The result of his investigation is set forth in his book, The Four Loves, which resists reductionistic treatments of the term and treats human love as both a profound good and a morally ambiguous power.[1] In the book, Lewis explores how natural human loves are related to divine love, and how genuinely good loves are distorted when we treat them as ultimates.

He distinguishes four principal forms of love: affection, friendship, erotic love, and charity. These forms correspond approximately to the Greek terms storgēphiliaerōs, and agapē, although Lewis is not engaged in a lexical study of Greek terminology, nor does he present the four loves as a simple hierarchy from lower to higher forms. His concern is instead anthropological, moral, and theological. 

Lewis asks how human beings love, what goods are embodied in their attachments, how those attachments become distorted, and how natural loves may be received, disciplined, enlarged, and transformed within a theological account of divine love.

Affection is the most familiar and perhaps the most pervasive of the loves Lewis describes. It develops through proximity, dependence, familiarity, shared history, and belonging, and is characteristic not only of family relationships but also of the attachments that arise wherever lives are intertwined over time.

The distinctive quality of affection lies in the fact that it does not ordinarily depend upon exceptional achievement or chosen compatibility. People may become deeply attached to relatives, neighbours, colleagues, fellow worshippers, or long-standing companions simply because they have inhabited a common social and emotional world. Affection contributes to the experience of home, continuity, and being known. It permits forms of attachment that are less selective than friendship and less intense than Eros, yet no less significant for the stability of human life.

Lewis nevertheless refuses to idealise affection. Familiarity may become entitlement, care may become control, and loyalty may become possessiveness. In such cases, the language of belonging shifts from “you belong with me” to “you belong to me.”  For this reason, affection requires moral formation. Its goodness depends upon whether familiarity is expressed through generosity rather than intrusion, gratitude rather than demand, and protection rather than domination.

Lewis gives Friendship an unusually elevated place within his account. Friendship arises when persons recognise that they share an interest, question, conviction, vocation, passion, or purpose. He draws the memorable contrast that lovers characteristically face one another whereas friends stand side by side attending to something beyond themselves that they value together.

The significance of this image lies in its account of friendship as the creation of a common world. Friends are not sustained merely by mutual liking; they are drawn together through shared attention to something beyond themselves. That common object may be intellectual, religious, vocational, artistic, political, recreational, or practical. The relationship deepens because each friend discovers that the other has perceived something similar and can participate in its further exploration.

This insight has direct relevance to marriage. Enduring relationships generally require more than continual introspection about the relationship itself; they are strengthened when spouses inhabit a shared world of family, vocation, faith, hospitality, creativity, justice, recreation, service, or common projects.

Friendship, however, is no more immune from distortion than affection. The experience of mutual recognition may become exclusivist, elitist, or resistant to criticism, particularly when a group of friends begins to define itself by the alleged incomprehension of outsiders. A healthy friendship must therefore remain outward-looking. Its common world should enlarge rather than constrict social imagination, and its intimacy should remain compatible with hospitality and engagement beyond the friendship itself.

Eros is the distinctive love of lovers, and Lewis carefully distinguishes it from sexual appetite considered in isolation. Sexual desire may merely seek pleasure or release for its own sake, whereas Eros, at its richest, is directed toward this particular person, whose physical and emotional presence acquires a singular significance for the lover. Erotic love may include attraction, longing, romance, sexual intimacy, vulnerability, delight, and the desire for embodied closeness. Its distinctive structure is personal rather than merely appetitive: the beloved is not simply interchangeable with another possible object of desire.

Lewis recognises the capacity of Eros to draw persons beyond self-absorption. The lover discovers that the good, beauty, and presence of another person have acquired unusual importance, and in this sense erotic love may open the self toward genuine relationality. The same intensity, however, creates moral danger. Eros may present itself as self-validating, leading persons to imagine that the strength of feeling is sufficient to justify whatever conduct follows from it.

At its best, Christian ethics seeks to resist such an outcome. The presence of desire does not determine moral rightness, and erotic love requires intentional formation through virtues such as fidelity, consent, mutuality, responsibility, respect, and concern for the genuine flourishing of the beloved. Eros becomes morally mature when desire honours rather than consumes the other person. Delight in the beloved must therefore remain inseparable from recognition of the beloved’s dignity, agency, and freedom.

Charity is Lewis’s fourth category, though it should not be reduced to altruism, benevolence, or dutiful self-sacrifice. His deeper contention is that the natural loves are genuine goods but lack moral and existential self-sufficiency. Affection, Friendship, and Eros cannot guarantee their own moral direction, nor can they sustain themselves unchanged across every circumstance. They are therefore vulnerable both to distortion and to decline.

Charity names the love of God as received and enacted in human life. It does not replace the natural loves but receives, disciplines, enlarges, and transforms them, enabling them to become more capacious and less dependent upon immediate reciprocity or emotional satisfaction. 

This transformation becomes especially important under conditions of change. Human beings do not remain equally attractive, healthy, agreeable, interesting, or emotionally available throughout life, and illness, ageing, disappointment, conflict, grief, and failure expose the limitations of love that depends entirely upon present gratification. Charity enables love to persist when spontaneous feeling weakens or circumstances become difficult. It therefore permits human love to become more than an exchange of satisfactions.

Yet Charity must not be confused with passive endurance or the erasure of the self. To seek another person’s good may require truth-telling, confrontation, accountability, boundaries, or separation. Christian self-giving cannot render injustice morally acceptable simply because it is endured sacrificially. Concern for another’s good must remain inseparable from truth, justice, and equal regard for the dignity of both persons.

Lewis further analyses love through the intersecting categories of Need-love, Gift-love, and Appreciative Love. These should not be regarded as a second taxonomy parallel to the four loves, but as distinct movements or dimensions that may operate within them.

Need-love arises from dependence and may be summarised as the recognition, “I need you.” Lewis refuses to interpret such need as automatically selfish, since human beings are creatures, whose existence is marked by dependence rather than self-sufficiency. The need for affection, recognition, friendship, care, companionship, and belonging is therefore not in itself a moral deficiency. It forms part of the structure of human creatureliness.

Gift-love moves in the opposite direction by seeking the good of another through service, protection, generosity, and care. Yet Gift-love may also become distorted when the giver assumes exclusive authority to determine what the recipient requires.

Appreciative Love introduces a third dimension. It delights in the particular goodness, beauty, or distinctiveness of the beloved and may be expressed as the recognition, “I am glad that you are you.”

The three dimensions are complementary. Mature love permits need without possession, self-giving without control, and appreciation without idolatry.

One of Lewis’s most enduring claims is that natural loves become dangerous when they are treated as ultimate. Affection may become possessive, Friendship exclusive, Eros idolatrous, and even apparently sacrificial love has the potential to become manipulative. Finite relationships cannot safely bear infinite expectations. 

This insight is particularly important for marriage, where one person may be expected to provide complete emotional fulfilment, identity, security, sexual satisfaction, companionship, meaning, and existential completion. Such expectations place an intolerable burden upon the relationship. Marriage becomes healthier when it is recognised as a profound but finite human good rather than as a substitute for transcendence.

Lewis’s argument is not that human beings should love cautiously in order to protect themselves from grief or preserve a superior attachment to God. On the contrary, he rejects emotional self-protection as the appropriate response to vulnerability. To love is necessarily to become vulnerable to another person’s joy, suffering, change, disappointment, absence, and eventual loss. The possibility of grief is not an accidental defect in love but part of its moral seriousness.

A proper Christian response to such vulnerability is not the cultivation of diminished attachment but courageous love. Creatures are to be loved deeply, while remaining creatures rather than objects of possession or sources of salvation. Love seeks communion without possession. Affection says, “You belong with me,” without becoming “You belong to me.” Friendship says, “We share a world,” without requiring absolute agreement or social enclosure. Eros says, “I desire you,” while respecting the freedom and dignity of the beloved. Charity says, “I seek your good,” without presuming that I alone may define what that good requires.

Lewis should nevertheless be read as a theological interlocutor rather than as a comprehensive contemporary authority on intimate relationships. Some of his assumptions concerning gender, sexuality, and relations between men and women reflect the social and intellectual context of the mid-twentieth century British and Anglican world. His account, enlightening as it is, requires supplementation by contemporary attention to equality, consent, mutuality, power, personal agency, and the social conditions within which intimate relationships are formed.

Even with these limitations, The Four Loves offers substantially more than a descriptive classification of the notion of love. It provides a theology of human loving in which love is received gratefully, given generously, appreciated joyfully, accepted as vulnerable, and disciplined by the refusal to make any finite relationship ultimate. As we come to understand and experience love in these complementary dimensions, we become more fully human and are better placed to find satisfaction in life and fulfil our human potential.


Rev Dr Rod Benson is General Secretary of the NSW Ecumenical Council and a minister of the Uniting Church in Australia serving at North Rocks Community Church in Sydney.

If you liked this article, you may like others in the series: Part 2 * Part 3 * Part 4 * Part 5

Reference

[1] C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York: HarperOne, 2017 [London, 1960]).

Image source: author.

Reflection questions

  1. Why does Lewis regard affection, friendship, and Eros as genuine goods that nevertheless require moral formation and transformation by Charity?
  2. How do Need-love, Gift-love, and Appreciative Love illuminate different dimensions of loving, and what might a healthy balance among them look like?
  3. What does it mean to say that natural loves become dangerous when they are treated as “gods”? How does this insight challenge contemporary expectations of marriage, friendship, family, or romantic fulfilment?

Application questions

  1. Which of Lewis’s four loves is strongest in your most important relationships at present, and which might need greater attention or cultivation?
  2. What shared interests, purposes, practices, or commitments create the “common world” of your closest relationships? What could you do to strengthen that shared world while remaining open to others?
  3. What would “courageous love” look like in one relationship in your life this week? Consider how you might love deeply while respecting the other person’s freedom, dignity, boundaries, and genuine good.

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