Understanding two forms of human concern
Rod Benson
Human concern takes many forms, from the quiet acknowledgement of another person’s loss to the sustained effort to understand an unfamiliar experience. Sympathy and empathy name two important dimensions of this concern. Although frequently used interchangeably, they identify different ways of responding to others. The distinction matters in relationships, pastoral ministry and public discourse. Yet we should resist turning it into a hierarchy in which sympathy represents inadequate care and empathy its superior replacement. Humane relationships can draw upon both, guided by attentive listening, humility and practical wisdom.
Concern and understanding
Sympathy ordinarily refers to concern for another person’s suffering or misfortune. We recognise that someone is experiencing hardship and respond with sorrow, kindness or a desire to help. Condolences, acknowledging illness or expressing concern after a disaster may communicate sympathy. Such responses do not require us to experience the other person’s emotions. Earlier philosophical uses of sympathy were broader; here the term denotes concern for suffering. Its moral significance lies in recognising that another’s suffering matters, even when its personal meaning remains beyond our understanding.
Empathy involves seeking to understand another person’s experience from their perspective, sometimes accompanied by emotional resonance. Common distinctions identify cognitive empathy with understanding another’s viewpoint and affective empathy with sharing something of their emotional state. These terms require care: researchers do not all define empathy identically, and some distinguish perspective-taking from empathy rather than treating it as one of its components. Understanding another’s feelings and experiencing a corresponding emotion are related but separable capacities.[1]
The familiar contrast between “feeling for” and “feeling with” is useful, provided it does not become absolute. Sympathy need not be cold or distant; empathy need not entail emotional fusion. On an influential account, empathy involves awareness that the experience belongs to another person. Without this distinction, emotional resonance may become emotional contagion. We can also empathise with joy, hope and excitement. Empathy concerns the wider range of human experience, whereas sympathy, in its ordinary contemporary usage, is especially associated with suffering.[2]
Humility in the presence of suffering
Bereavement illustrates why these forms of concern should work together. “I am sorry for your loss” can be a deeply appropriate expression of sympathy. Its simplicity acknowledges suffering without claiming privileged access to it. A meal, a thoughtful message or help with ordinary responsibilities may communicate that concern more effectively than elaborate speech. Such responses should recognise the bereaved person’s dignity and offer welcome support.[3]
Empathy may deepen this encounter, but it should remain tentative. “It sounds as though the evenings are particularly difficult” invites confirmation or correction. “I know exactly how you feel” can discourage correction by asserting an equivalence that the speaker cannot establish. Even people who have experienced comparable losses differ in their relationships, histories and circumstances. Similar experience can assist understanding, but it does not authorise us to substitute our story for theirs.
This humility also qualifies imaginative perspective-taking. Asking how I would feel in another’s situation can begin reflection, but it may reveal more about me than about them. A better question is how this person understands what has happened. Cultural background, faith, disability, economic circumstances and previous experiences may shape that understanding. Research by Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel and Nicholas Epley found that conversation improved accuracy in understanding others, whereas imagined perspective-taking did not consistently do so. Responsible empathy combines imagination with inquiry, treating the other person as an interpreter of their own life.[4]
Listening that leaves room
Attentive listening can deepen both sympathetic concern and empathic understanding. It involves allowing another person to speak, tolerating silence and asking questions that clarify rather than interrogate. Tone and expression offer clues but cannot reveal another’s inner life with certainty. “Have I understood you correctly?” is often more respectful than confident interpretation. Listening becomes an ethical practice when it permits the speaker to correct our assumptions.
Reflecting feelings can be helpful, especially when someone struggles to articulate distress. “You seem exhausted after trying so hard” may communicate understanding. Such language should emerge from conversation rather than a rehearsed technique. Repeatedly naming emotions can feel intrusive or mechanical. Nor does every disclosure require exploration. Someone may want acknowledgement, practical assistance or companionship rather than a searching conversation. Good care attends to these preferences.
Premature reassurance and advice can obstruct this process. “Everything will be fine” may serve the listener’s wish to reassure more than the speaker’s need to be understood. “I am sorry you feel that way” can sound evasive, particularly when the speaker has described harm for which the listener bears responsibility. Where an apology is warranted, sympathetic language should not replace it. Recognition, accountability and a willingness to repair harm are distinct obligations.
Care with boundaries
In pastoral ministry, sympathetic concern and empathic understanding help make space for grief, doubt and disappointment. Christian care can draw upon the summons to bear one another’s burdens and to rejoice and weep with others (Gal 6:2; Rom 12:15). Read as resources for pastoral care, these texts encourage shared participation in another’s life. They do not establish modern psychological categories but support a community of care rather than placing every responsibility upon a single minister.
Such care requires boundaries. A pastor need not reproduce another person’s distress to remain compassionate, and pastoral care does not, by itself, constitute specialist counselling. Some ministers hold counselling qualifications, but all should recognise their competence limits and refer appropriately. For Uniting Church ministers, regular professional supervision is an ongoing responsibility.[5] Privacy, consent and clarity about one’s role protect the person receiving care. In workplaces, similar principles encourage respectful support: concern can be expressed without demanding intimate disclosure or presuming that managerial authority confers emotional understanding.
In conflict, empathy may disclose fears and unmet needs beneath an argument. Understanding why another person feels threatened can help us respond more carefully. However, understanding is not endorsement. We may recognise someone’s anger while rejecting intimidation, or acknowledge their grievance while disputing its interpretation. Reconciliation requires attention to truth, responsibility and unequal power. Research on intergroup dialogue suggests that being heard can be especially important for less powerful participants.[6] Empathy should not become a demand that people experiencing harm accommodate those who have harmed them.
From feeling to responsibility
Public expressions of sympathy after violence or disaster can affirm solidarity, but their adequacy depends partly on what follows. Leaders should ask what affected communities need and respect their participation and local knowledge, consistent with humanitarian standards.[7] Likewise, vivid individual stories may awaken concern while less visible suffering receives little attention. Ethical judgment must therefore ask whose experiences were overlooked. Universal human dignity calls us to extend concern beyond those whose lives are easiest to imagine.
Practical compassion may involve accompanying someone to an appointment, changing an unreasonable expectation or advocating for fair treatment. These actions need not await complete emotional understanding. We can recognise an obligation to help while remaining uncertain about another’s feelings and ask them what assistance would be welcome.
Sympathy and empathy are best understood as complementary resources within a larger practice of compassion. Sympathy recognises suffering as worthy of concern; empathy seeks a more attentive understanding of another’s experience. Neither guarantees wise action. In relationships, both benefit from listening, humility and the courage to respond appropriately. The measure of humane care is not how convincingly we claim to feel another’s pain, but whether our presence and actions honour their dignity, preserve their agency and help meet their needs.
Rod Benson lives in Sydney and writes about a range of topics from books and local history to food, faith, philosophy, ethics, research skills, and everyday life. Away from the keyboard, he enjoys cooking for friends, walking in the Australian bush, exploring a beach, discovering new restaurants, and reading philosophy, fiction and poetry. He is married to Emma.
Rod Benson lives in Sydney and writes about a range of topics from books and local history to food, faith, philosophy, ethics, research skills, and everyday life. Away from the keyboard, he enjoys cooking for friends, walking in the Australian bush, exploring a beach, discovering new restaurants, and reading philosophy, fiction and poetry. He is married to Emma.
References
[1] Julia Stietz, Emanuel Jauk, Sören Krach and Philipp Kanske, “Dissociating empathy from perspective-taking: Evidence from intra- and inter-Individual differences research,”Frontiers in Psychiatry 10 (2019), article 126. Available at https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2019.00126
[2] Tania Singer and Olga M. Klimecki, “Empathy and Compassion,” Current Biology 24 (18), 2014, R875–R878. Available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.06.054
[3] Cancer Council, “How to Help Someone Who Is Grieving,” Cancer Connect. Available at https://connect.cancer.org.au/cancer-information/advanced-cancer/grief/how-to-help-someone-who-is-grieving
[4] Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel and Nicholas Epley, “Perspective mistaking: Accurately understanding the mind of another requires getting perspective, not taking perspective,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 114 (4), 2018, 547–571. Available at https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000115
[5] Uniting Church in Australia, Code of Ethics and Ministry Practice, especially sections 3.9 and 4.3. Available at https://hub.ucaqld.com.au/wp-content/uploads/A0.10-Code-of-Ethics-and-Ministry-Practice.pdf.
[6] Emile G. Bruneau and Rebecca Saxe, “The power of being heard: The benefits of ‘perspective-giving’ in the context of intergroup conflict,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (4), 2012, 855–866. Available at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.017.
[7] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, “Code of Conduct for the movement and NGOs in disaster relief,” available at https://www.ifrc.org/our-promise/do-good/code-conduct-movement-ngos, especially principles 6–7.
Image source: University of Melbourne
